1 aren't recurring in any way, are they?

MR. GOYAL: I assume they wouldn't be recurring if the costs would reflect the manual processing of orders that drop out of OSS.

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: We are just trying to understand what you wrote here. It's not a mystery, but we're trying to figure out what is it that you would be charging when you referred to this, whatever it is, JDPL. We are just trying to get at what it is that you think you should assert that you would charge for or are charging for.

MS. FOX: What's that section?

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: III-6. It's under

14 | III-6.

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MR. GOYAL: It's the Verizon rationale 16 column.

MS. FOX: What page are you on?

MR. GOYAL: It's page two of my printout.

MS. FARROBA: It's not the contract

20 language, but the rationale that you have. It's 21 towards the bottom on page two.

MR. GOYAL: Maybe just to focus the

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1 answers, I don't want to take up too much time, but 2 | what I'm trying to figure out here is, is there a disagreement, and what's Verizon's position and what's WorldCom's position.

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ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: WorldCom, do you understand there to be a disagreement between you on this point?

MR. GOLDFARB: I have not seen the JDPL language, so I'm not sure if there is a disagreement. Perhaps it would be useful for me to look at it also.

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: Why don't we pick it up at a break, and why don't you move on.

MR. GOYAL: Okay. The last question I had on issue III-6 has to do with language in Verizon's 16 proposed -- if I can find it.

Verizon proposes language under issue III-6 that would allow it to conform to a change in the law regarding UNE combinations by the filing of a tariff, and I just want to explore the interplay between that language and I will find it in a minute. I think it's 4.7. No, I'm sorry, it's

 $1 \parallel 1.41$  in the UNE attachment, and I wanted to explore 2 the interplay between that language and Verizon's 3 position on change of law issues.

Does it reflect your position on change of 5 | law issues. And I realize the panel you have up 6 now is talking about UNEs and not business process or general terms and conditions.

But to the extent you guys can testify on that --

MR. ANTONIOU: Would you like to know what our rationale is for that clause?

> MR. GOYAL: Yes.

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MR. ANTONIOU: I will think of an example 14∥we are all familiar with. The UNE Remand Order. 15 Out of that order in November of '99 came a set of 16∥new UNEs, some of them I think 30 days, some 17 120-day items if I recall right.

And I for one among many at Verizon had lots of discussions with various CLECs about some 20 |of that language. Sometimes the language that we 21 made available by the date of the effectiveness for 22 the particular UNEs folks accepted and were happy

1 | with. Sometimes they had some issues, sometimes they had lots of issues. But the bottom line is the goal of this language here is to have a particular forum if anybody has a problem with some new service that it is that we have to provide or 5 II some new UNE in this case, and if folks have a 7 | problem with it, then they come in as a group, a la a collaborative, although it's in the context of looking at a tariff, and the applicable commission takes a look at all of the complaints that folks 10 might have, takes a look at our position, and makes 11 a judgment about what should be in the tariff. 12 it's done fairly efficiently and quickly and we frankly prefer that as opposed to having literally 15 hundreds of carriers come back and say well, we 16 don't like this, we don't like that, and then they have very legitimate points. I don't mean to denigrate the point, but the point is for those of 18 us trying to take into account all these various 19 points from a efficiency standpoint both for us and for them, the other carriers, the CLECs want to get 21 the benefit of whatever it is that they are getting

1 | new as quickly as possible. We would want them to 2 have that benefit because we don't want them to 3 | have complaints. We don't want them to say we gave 4 | you a full markup of this and you haven't responded 5 | back to us. It's been 10 days. Where are you 6 folks? From their perspective, it's very important 7 | that they get done. And we appreciate that.

From our perspective we've got 200 people 9 nipping at our heels--rightly from their 10 perspective -- but how do we get it all done? We 11 prefer it be done in the tariffs. The powers that 12 be that have to make the decisions have all the 13 | arguments in front of them and they get it done for 14 better or for worse, and that's the reason for the language.

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MS. FARROBA: Do you think that process is quicker?

It's quicker than dealing MR. ANTONIOU: with individual carriers. One person comes. Small market. Somebody else comes in with all sorts of changes. I lived it. It's not a pleasant process.

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: As opposed to like

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1 this process.

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MR. ANTONIOU: I like this process.

MR. GOYAL: Is there a reference to that process elsewhere in Mr. -- Verizon's proposed lanquage?

MR. ANTONIOU: I used the term "collaborative" as sort of an analogy to the fact that in looking at a tariff that we would submit, folks are going to come in like, for example, the 10 UNE tariff that we have in New York they are going to make their ex parte comments to staff there as they have, and say, you know, we think Verizon is okay, on this, on this one they're all wrong, and here's why. We're going to come in, make our same comments. We will have hearings. It will get 16 done. So that's at least a vehicle. We may in 17 some instance think it's discreet enough to do it through a contract amendment. But if it's some new 19∥set of UNEs that are pretty involved, this may be 20 the more efficient way to do it.

21 MS. FARROBA: Is this a WorldCom or AT&T 22 l issue?

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MR. GOYAL: This is in language proposed to WorldCom, although I think it's also reflected 3 | in the language proposed by AT&T.

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MS. FARROBA: Okay. Are you opposed to doing it through the tariff process?

MR. LATHROP: I don't think we are generally, but as a process issue, if this Commission is standing in the stead of the Virginia Commission, I suppose that Verizon's tariff filings, which would ordinarily go to the Virginia Commission and then be subject to opposals by a variety of parties, might come here.

So, my point is just that the language provided in Verizon's 1.4 does not provide a sufficient process to reach a resolution. include language mutually agreed by parties, but it's not surprising that it's often the case that Verizon's filings are not mutually agreed even in a sort of collaborative workshop session. So we might want clarity of process by which we would get whatever tariff language is filed into the product that was intended.

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: I'm not hearing Verizon object to that little bit more clarity, are You guys might want to talk about this further, this issue off-line further. Because it sounds like there is a fair amount of understanding with a desire to move forward with a tariff process, but some desire to flesh it out.

MS. KELLEY: If I could interject also, we do have some tariff versus ICA issues that this panel, are not witnesses for, and there are some nuances that -- so anything they say here I don't want to be taken as sort of a more global statement of our position on that issue.

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MS. FARROBA: This would just be limited to this particular issue.

MR. ANTONIOU: We certainly would like to put our heads together and see if we could find something that both parties can live with.

MR. GOYAL: Moving on. I have--I think I only have one question for issue III-A, and that's 21 directed to AT&T. I just want to make sure I understand.

With respect to III-A, it sounds like AT&T's position on III-8 conforms really closely to its position on issue of III-11. The underlying dispute with Verizon is basically the same as the dispute with issue III-11 which is access to subloops and sub-UNEs and MTEs.

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I guess I want to clarify. Is there any substantive contract language or substantive dispute here for you guys in III-8 that's not already covered by III-11?

MR. PFAU: I don't believe so.

MR. GOYAL: There's all I got.

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: Okay. Trying to decide if it's worth a 10-minute break now and--and moving in--

MR. KEHOE: One housekeeping thing?

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: No, one second,

Could I ask you guys what your preference is? I guess we have about likely 45 minutes more of questions is my guesstimate. Would you like us to start and take some of the issues or--and then

1 move into a panel, the next panel, or do you want to take a break quickly now?

MR. HARRINGTON: To the extent we could address the record request issue before the break, I would be very pleased by that, but if not, I will 6 wait.

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: We only had one 8 record request, and so I will tell you right now we won't decide the global issue on record requests. 10 We'll decide that specific one later today, so you won't miss out on any discussion.

MR. GARY: We also have just for the 13 record I understand John White from the advanced services panel is the one to answer the integrated digital loop carrier, and he is here, and whenever 16 you'd like him to join the panel, he will.

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: The question is, do we want to take a five-minute break now? Yes. will take a five-minute break now and then we'll come back.

(Brief recess.)

Whereupon,

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JOHN WHITE

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was called for examination by counsel for

Commission and, after having been duly sworn by the

notary public, was examined and testified as

follows:

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: Go ahead and say who you are representing.

MR. WHITE: John White for Verizon.

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: In case there is somebody here in the room for subpanel two, which would be the third panel of the day, I don't think that's going to happen today, so I think we are lucky to get into a subpanel five, which should be the second group. We are hoping to push through to that, but in case people for their schedules I don't think that's likely to happen today.

MR. THAGGART: I'm Henry Thaggart, attorney advisor at the policy division, and just to echo the comments of my colleagues earlier today, and by way of full disclosure I'm going to asking questions about areas in the record that I view as not clear or not complete; and so to the

1 extent that I'm asking questions to one group more than the other that is why, and you should view this as your opportunity to expand, clarify, and complete the record testimony.

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I first want to start with issue III-7 C, and in particular I would like to talk about the termination liability clause. This is directed to the Verizon panel.

Directing Verizon's attention to the Verizon reply dated May 31st, it's at page 63 of the Verizon reply. And by way of note, I don't think this is one of the exhibits so I'm going to refer to it as the Verizon reply. Page 63. sorry, page 83.

The testimony states that Verizon seeks to be made whole. Is there someone here that can discuss that issue?

MS. FOX: Yes, actually we did address that in--we did answer that question in III-7, and what we meant by that is if a customer purchases special access and, say, signed up for a five-year plan, disconnects after two years, then what would 1 be owed under termination liability would be 2 essentially be the difference in price between the 3 five year rates and the two year rates.

So, when we say make Verizon whole, we expect to be paid the appropriate rates for the time the service was in effect.

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And that's pursuant to the terms of the tariff.

I know there were multiple responses to III-7, AT&T's III-7 discovery request, but we did spell that answer out in the request.

MR. THAGGART: Actually, that wasn't my question, but thank you.

I was wondering whether there was a rule of thumb or calculus that you could share with the Commission, share with the staff, that would inform us on how to go about quantifying this issue of being made whole.

MS. FOX: Well, since--what seems to me to be fair is that the CLEC purchases service pursuant to tariff, disconnects prematurely, then it owes us 22 something for the time the service has been in

1 effect, and in accordance with the termination 2||liability provisions and specific calculations 3 spelled out in the tariff.

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MR. THAGGART: Right. I understand the 5 | fairness issue, but I'm wondering whether there is a particular formula you all employ in looking at 7 the determining termination liability.

MS. FOX: Termination liability is 9 governed by specific calculations included and 10 explained in the tariff.

And it depends on how long you've had the service at the time you disconnected it. There are 13 | two options. We calculate the value for both 14 options and assess the lesser of the two. And it depends on the service that you purchased and the term plan. There are minor differences in calculations for DS1 versus DS3, for example.

MR. THAGGART: And so the fee is based on the particular service, and it does not vary from customer to customer?

MS. FOX: Well, the calculation depends. Let's just take a--as I started to talk about it, a

8 actually satisfied.

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1 five-year DS1 circuit that's disconnected after two 2 years. The CLEC actually or IXC or whoever 3 purchased that, satisfied a two-year term. So the 4 terms of the tariffs state that under one of the 5∥options, what's fair and what would make us whole 6 lis if you pay us as though you have taken a 7 two-year term plan because that's the time that you

And so the term liability would be the 10 difference in price between the five year rates for 11 DS1 and the two year rates for DS1.

Now, what that actually comes out to be I 13 can't tell you without sitting at my computer and 14∥at a spreadsheet.

MR. THAGGART: Does this formula or this 16 | calculus differ for any other sort of conversion or 17 termination policy at Verizon?

MS. FOX: Well, as I said, we need to know 19 what service we are talking about, what term plan 20 we are talking about, then we go look in the tariff 21 and study what the specific termination liability 22 provisions are for that service.

Now, I can give you the tariff references
or we could talk specifically--I had a page here
that summarizes what the termination liability is.
The real subject matter experts on term liability
are the special access product manager, and I have
to admit I'm not a special access product manager,
I'm an EEL and dedicated transport product manager,
but I do have familiarity with those provisions in
the tariff.

MR. THAGGART: And just so I understand, does the termination liability policy differ for conversion of service versus actual termination of service?

MS. FOX: No.

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MR. THAGGART: It's the same?

MS. FOX: Right, because to us that's discontinuance of service prior to the committed term plan.

MR. THAGGART: I would like to ask AT&T a response--to respond. Specifically, what rules of thumb or calculus does AT&T propose the Commission consider? Specifically, AT&T refers to appropriate

1 termination penalties in its testimony. Are there calculus or rules of thumbs that we should impose or consider when determining what is appropriate?

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MR. PFAU: I think there are three factors that need to be considered. First, I think you have to look at the opportunity to recover your incurred costs. No businessperson would provide a service to another party knowing they would lose money as a result of the termination.

I think you also need to look at how other customers are treated, and I think you also then have to look at what would occur in a competitive marketplace.

I think when you do that, you will see 15∥that the situation we have here is relatively unique. As a first consideration, your special access tariffs were not constructed in an environment where there is a competitive marketplace or any kind of competitive discipline placed on the construction of a tariff, and in many cases there are purchases of special access simply because parties couldn't get the equivalent UNEs.

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1 For some reason it was easier to get special access 2 than it was to get the equivalent UNE and UNE combination.

So, as a result, I think you have to look at any existing termination liabilities with a jaundiced eye.

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: Can I interrupt you there. Are you in some way limited right now from challenging those termination liabilities under the 10 tariff?

MR. PFAU: We would have to be able to 12 comply with the conversion restrictions in order to 13∥have any meaningful volume to have a challenge on. And at this point we've not been able to--

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: I don't understand 16∥your answer. You couldn't on its face challenge the tariff as an unreasonable termination 18 liability?

I will look to my legal team MR. PFAU: 20 over there on that one.

> Wake up now. ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD:

MR. KEFFER: The answer to your question

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is yes, you're only looking at the tariff within the narrow confines of special access service.

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ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: I'm just exploring the concept that these are tariffs that were identified or developed in -- that are in somehow in effect contracts of adhesion or one-sided contracts, and yet -- and I think as I understand your testimony, you're arguing that because of that, the termination liabilities -- we ought to consider language that would not impose termination liabilities because of the nature of the special access tariff. What I'm trying to explore is, I don't understand why the vehicle needs to be--why you don't have a vehicle to challenge those as tariff terms currently.

MR. KEFFER: The answer is, those terms may be perfectly appropriate in instances where carriers are buying special access. If AT&T is 19∥buying special access from Verizon and agrees to a term plan and does not live up to the obligations 21 under that term plan, then termination liability provisions should apply. But that's not what we

are talking about here. We are talking about more than that.

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We are talking about a circumstance where AT&T would have liked to have used UNEs, for ∥example, to provide a particular service, but wasn't able to do so because Verizon wasn't making it available, refusing to make them available in the time frame we wanted, or dug in its heels and refused to provide UNEs.

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: But is it violating the law when it says that you have an option to 12 purchase it under a special access as a loop transport combination at the outset? Is that your 14 position?

MR. KEFFER: I didn't follow your question.

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: Well, you're saying that there is a difference between when I have purchased it for truly special access and when I'm purchasing it to convert it for a UNE. I mean, isn't that what you were suggesting?

MR. KEFFER: I'm still not following your

1 question.

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: I'm sorry, I'm not being clear.

I understood your answer to be that they may be perfectly acceptable, "they" meaning the termination liability may be perfectly acceptable in the context where I am purchasing special access services, and therefore, not appropriately subject to a facial challenge, for example, as an unreasonable penalty as a matter of special access. But I understood you to say, but here, because of something Verizon has done, and I was exploring what it was that they had done, but because of something they've done, you've purchased it through--you've purchased the loop transport combination through special access with the intent to convert.

MR. KEFFER: Or we purchased it and now we have the ability to convert it because of the changes in the Commission's rules and policies, and in that circumstance, Verizon wants very much to hold us to termination penalties to maximize their

revenues and preclude us from taking advantage of UNE conversion availability.

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ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: Well, I guess what I'm trying to explore, and I understand your answer, but I mean, we are kind of dancing around the question why you wouldn't, as an initial matter, order them through as a UNE. The loop transport combination, why wouldn't you order that right now as a UNE?

MR. KEFFER: Well, I think now where that service is available to us, we should be ordering  $\parallel$ it that way. Up until now, and we don't have a witness on this, but there have been instances where we have expressed an interest in ordering a 15 loop transport combination as a UNE, and been given 16 various reasons why that's not available, but if we 17 are willing to order it at the higher price special access rates, suddenly, lo and behold, it's become 19 available.

So sometimes you order special transport 21 just as a matter of business expediency, so you 22 don't have to debate whether the UNE arrangement is |available.

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ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: So, but if you're ordering it a business ex--let's use that as an If you're ordering it because you have example. chosen to order it because your business plan is such that you want to order it, I'm going to direct it back to your witness unless you think this is just a legal question, but you're ordering it, and you're telling me that you think if you order it as a special access circuit, it can be, in fact, perfectly appropriate to have certain penalties, why isn't--I mean, isn't Verizon then in a position where it's priced its special access for which you're now paying for that service based on an understanding that it would have this for a--let's use your five year example, a five-year commitment at that price? That's what you're paying for when you initially buy it.

Or, alternatively, are you saying it's really that five year price--that termination is too high and not reasonable to begin with? That was what I was trying to explore, based on your

1 testimony, that was suggesting that these tariffs 2 were really not priced correctly.

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MR. PFAU: Well, certainly I would say they're not priced correctly, but I think you had a lot of questions in there.

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: I know I did.

MR. PFAU: I will see whether I can hit at least a majority of them.

I think the one of the problems you have with the current special access tariffs is that we 11 have been ordering loops and loop transport configurations to connect to our networks because 13 | it's been expedient to serve customers, and while 14 we may not want to pay as much as we do for special 15 $\parallel$ access to serve a customer, at least by getting the 16∥special access under the term plan, we can serve 17∥some customers and a little revenue, assuming 18 || you're making some money on it, is better than no 19 revenue.

Obviously, if we could have bought them 21 outright as UNEs, that would have been better. To 22|buy them at month to month special access rates

would have been a lot worse.

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So, I think the point we are making is 3 that special access is recognized to be priced well 4 above its economic costs. I mean, orders of 5 magnitude two times.

Therefore, to then come back and say well, 7 because you had no alternative in the past and but 8 do now, you have to pay me an extortionate rate to 9 | get out of this prior contract doesn't seem to be 10 an appropriate treatment of the situation.

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: But again, this is 12∥where I come back to, if they are unreasonably high 13∥costs, aren't you protected by process at this 14 Commission to challenge this as unreasonable under 15 201 theory?

MR. ANTONIOU: Could we have an opportunity to speak?

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: Yes, of course.

19 MR. PFAU: I don't think I finished with 20 his question.

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: Go ahead, Chris. And then we'll come back. 22

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1 MR. ANTONIOU: I heard words back in Ohio where I come from; they're called fighting words. Extortion, this hyperbolic commentary from 3 Mr. Keffer, about how we kept them away and not given them and sort of held back and dug in our heels. Hey, if we don't have to build them, you don't get a superior network. That means you 8 didn't have a right to them. We didn't diq in our heels. You didn't have a right to them. We didn't have an obligation. So that's why you took special access, so let's settle down with the rhetoric. 11 12 You didn't get them because we had no obligation.

Now you got a right to convert them. Pay up. If you don't like it, go to the Commission, file a complaint about the termination liability.

This is sort ridiculous commentary.

You took what you wanted to do your business.

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ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: We don't have to escalate the rhetoric. I was just trying to get at the legal obligation. That's what I'm really trying to get at, and I understand.

MR. PFAU: Should I go back to answering

your questions on the criteria that should be looked at because I think this all gets into some of the same stuff.

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MR. THAGGART: Are you finished with your line of question, Dorothy?

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: See, he's a good staff attorney.

I would actually like some response to the problem that I'm have understanding AT&T's position here, putting aside the questions of whether the rates are high or the state of the special access market. I'm asking really as a legal matter. are asking that we include language in an interconnection agreement because you feel that you 15 need that protection in light of the way in which you have elected to convert on special access.

My question is, to some degree, is the protection you're seeking already existent under the state of the law that protects against certain 20 | rates and charges that are unreasonable under a challenge to a tariff? And therefore, is this language necessary to protect the rights that you

have identified, putting the rhetoric in
wherever--we will deal with each side's concerns
about special access, but I'm asking really more of
what does this language add for you that is not
existent under the mechanisms of a tariff review or
challenge to a tariff.

MR. PFAU: Are you asking for a legal opinion? Because that sounded like a lot of law.

I can only talk from the standpoint of trying to--getting in the market and trying not to end up losing your shirt in the process. So, Mark, if you could render some opinion on the--

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MR. KEFFER: And I've tried. If your question is, could we mount a legal challenge to argue that now that the rules of provisioning have changed and loop and transport combinations are available as EELs, that we could mount some sort of complaint against Verizon's special access tariffs to challenge termination liability provisions, the short answer is I've never thought of that, and if that's what you're suggesting, maybe we will take that back and think about it.

I think the problem we are trying to deal 2 with here, though, is the circumstance that  $3 \parallel Mr$ . Pfau and I are both trying to convey, is that in the past, the only thing available to us has been special access arrangements. Now that that's changed, and there should not be a punishment attached to the use of EEL arrangements, there should not be a financial penalty that attaches to that.

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And our approach here is to try to deal with that through the Interconnection Agreement but if what you're suggesting is that the Commission would want to deal with that more broadly in the tariff review context; I've not given that any thought before you raised the question, and I would have to go back and think that through.

MR. GARY: The issue really is not all that difficult. I think you're onto the answer. Verizon provided the service under its tariff and 20 | it properly provided the service. There was no complaint back then that the service was improperly provisioned. And now it has a termination

1 | liability in the tariff and that's what Verizon Virginia will comply with, and we believe the Commission previously healed that termination liabilities are applicable to the conversion to 5 UNEs.

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So, this is really a pretty simple question, quite frankly, and the fact that AT&T doesn't want to pay the termination liability isn't determinative; the fact that Verizon has the legal authority and the right to charge that termination liability under its tariffs as approved by this Commission.

And I guess you've heard the MR. KEFFER: answer to the complaint that you suggested, so.

Part of the problem I had in addressing your question is it sort of assumes that everything starts from the same moment in time, and from my 18 perspective, special access has been around a long time. It's been overpriced for a long time. Mr. Gary says, we haven't complained about the I don't think that's quite true. 21 rates. 22 AT&T has complained about special access pricing

pretty much every step of the pricing process.

The issue that we are dealing with here arises as a result of the availability of EELs, and how can you take those high-priced special access arrangements that you sort of had no option but to buy in the past and get those converted to EELs without incurring financial punishment for doing so?

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: So, I guess then your testimony goes only to the currently existing termination liabilities?

MR. KEFFER: If special access and EELs are equally available to us from now going forward, and we mess up and buy the wrong one to meet our needs, and we buy special access and there are termination liabilities that apply, then I will say we will be responsible for them, and we would pay them.

If we terminated that special access arrangement.

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: Okay. So, the language you propose is intended to not govern the

purchase of special access January 2002, but it's to govern the purchase of special access that has been already. Is that my understanding?

I don't think we have seen that MR. GARY: distinction.

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: I didn't read the testimony, but I'm hearing you say that. wrong?

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MR. PFAU: Talking at this from a layperson's standpoint, the issue seems to be just on paragraph 11.13.6, and that is only one sentence, and it seems to be fairly well focused. And it says in the event that the termination of any service that is converted to unbundled network elements would otherwise affect AT&T's ability to satisfy any term or volume requirements applicable to existing services pursuant to contract or a Verizon tariff, AT&T shall not be liable for any termination liabilities or other requirements under 20 such contract or tariff.

This is very clearly saying we bought it as a special access, we want to make it a UNE

combination, we don't want to be penalized for making that change.

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Obviously, if the UNE is available and it's priced lower, we would be pretty silly to be buying it new in that special access arrangement. If the special access arrangement were a price lower, we probably wouldn't buy it as a UNE. So I don't see in the future if truly UNEs or UNE combinations are available on a practical matter that we would buy it in the wrong plan.

MS. PREISS: Could I explore a question about the quantification of the termination liability? I understand, I think, AT&T's argument to be sort of a fresh look type argument because of the availability of certain combinations that weren't available before.

Leaving that aside for a minute, and I think, Ms. Fox, this is addressed to you, I'm going to stumble a bit, but bear with me.

Termination liability, as I understand it, is calculated by Verizon to take into account that 21 | 22 you provisioned certain plant and you have assumed

1∥that over a five-year term in your example that you will recover your costs plus some return on those costs through a certain monthly recurring charge that you will receive for 60 months. AT&T then under the -- leaving aside the UNE combinations to date, if they terminated after two years, you would not have recovered some of those costs because you had spread them over 60 months when you calculated that, and you would have a termination liability that would allow to you cover the costs that you didn't--would have otherwise recovered over five Is that sort of accurate?

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MS. FOX: In theory that sounds accurate.

MS. PREISS: But it seems to me that one thing I need to understand is AT&T I think AT&T is arguing that when, instead of discontinuing service altogether, instead they're converting to a UNE combination, Verizon's revenue stream isn't cut off altogether. You're continuing to receive revenue associated with that in-plant investment, just at a lower rate, the UNE rate as opposed to the special access rate.

So, in that case, if the termination liability was calculated to recover the cost as if you were receiving no revenue going forward for the rest of that five-year term, then is it possible or is it consistent that the amount of the termination liability is not appropriate taking into account that Verizon is, in fact, continuing to receive some revenue?

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MS. FOX: Well, it depends on the--there are two options that are calculated when a customer discontinues service, and that's exactly what happens when a carrier requests to convert a service from special access to UNE; that's discontinuance of service in accordance with the terms of the tariff.

MS. PREISS: They're no longer purchasing out of the tariff?

MS. FOX: That's right.

And under option two, I believe, what the carrier would be billed would be the difference in price between the five year rates and the two year rates from the time the plan had been in effect.

So that means that if--I will just stick to the
same example I have been using. If the carrier had
satisfied two years of the five years of the
five-year term, then the term liability would be
the difference in price, so that at the end it
would be as though the carrier had paid the
two-year prices for two-year term plan, so there is
nothing--nothing about the years three, four, and
five that come into play here.

MS. PREISS: But in my example, you're continuing to receive revenue for years three, four, and five. Just at a different level.

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MS. FOX: At a greatly reduced UNE rate.

MS. PREISS: But a rate that is higher than zero.

MS. FOX: Right, but how does that have anything to do with being compensated appropriately for the short period of time that the service had been in effect? There are no term liabilities associated with discontinuing a UNE, the way they are with special access.

MR. PFAU: Could I point something out

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that I think could be missed. You talk about when 2 you convert to UNEs, when you're looking at special access, that was assuming some economies that were amortized over a five-year period. UNEs assume no commitment. They are reflecting what you would pay on an economic basis for using it month to month to month:

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So, when I buy that UNE or convert to that UNE, I'm theoretically paying a higher cost than what I would have had for a contractual obligation for multiple years. So there is no issue going The issue is the forward of not recovering costs. profit level isn't high enough to satisfy them.

THAGGART: MR. Verizon, would you respond, please.

MR. GANSERT: This isn't a cost panel or economics panel. I think you should take it up then, but I tell you right now, I'm an engineer, I also have an MBA, that's close to nonsense, that statement that there is nothing in the UNE calculation that makes an assumption that service is being disconnected every month. It's based upon 1 assuming that the facility is used over the normal life that we use it in our network, so there is just nothing to do with term within the cost of UNEs.

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MR. PFAU: The life of the network, you make no assumption that's in continuous use for a particular customer.

> MR. GANSERT: That's correct.

ARBITRATOR ATTWOOD: I think we understand everyone's position. We will move on.

MR. THAGGART: Just so that the record is clear and the witness out of fairness gets an opportunity to answer the question asked, I will 14 restate it. Then you can answer it.

Directing your attention to AT&T Exhibit 2 in which you testified that AT&T is willing to pay appropriate termination fees, what factors do you consider when you discuss appropriate termination fees?

MR. PFAU: I think I started out before we 21 made this half our digression, that it would be 22|based on cost recovery, that the appropriate costs

1 should be recovered, which means if we were paying 2 something less than the economic costs, there probably should be some sort of a termination liability, or there was not an opportunity to recover a cost legitimately incurred. When the service was established, there may be an appropriate termination liability.

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I think I said that you have to look at how other customers are being treated, and I think some of the discovery requests get to that, showing 11∥that termination liabilities are adjusted for other 12 parties whether they're--in cases where there are 13 H rate increases, they'll adjust it, if there are cases of rate decreases, they adjust it, if the 15 network is optimized, they'll adjust it.

So, those factors have to be considered when there is a denial of an adjustment of a termination liability to a CLEC.

And then, finally, I think you have to 20∥look at what would happen in a competitive market. 21∥In a competitive market, I think even Verizon's 22|contracts address that. Say, if there is a

1 alternative bid in the marketplace, that Verizon 2 has the choice to either meet the bid or let you 3 out of the contract. It's my understanding that the UNE prices are intended to emulate what would 5 be in a competitive marketplace.

What we are saying is either meet the price or let us out of the contract.

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MS. FOX: Well, again, this isn't a UNE 9 cost proceeding, but I think some of the comments 10 are subjective, and I don't think it would be easy 11 to determine, or is an easy thing to determine what 12| the appropriate cost standard should be. 13∥say that we are applying term liability differently 14 is not true because what he cited are actually 15∥spelled out in the tariff, so to say we are 16 applying termination liability for different 17 customers in different ways is not a true 18 statement. We are applying termination liability, 19 according to the terms spelled out in the tariff 20∥the same way for everyone who buys service out of 21 the tariff.

> Could I ask a tariff MS. PREISS:

1∥follow-up question? Then I will be quiet. 2 sorry, I'm interrupting.

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Are we only talking about special access purchase out of the federal tariffs here?

MS. FOX: For the most part, that's my understanding that that's what we are focused on.

MS. PREISS: Is that AT&T's issue? 8 Because there is no Verizon, at least so far as I 9 know, and I think I should know, has not any ability or has not yet exercised its ability to engage in any contracts or contract tariffs and 12 special access; right?

> MS. FOX: That's right.

MS. PREISS: It can't negotiate -- well, they have some pricing flexibility, and they haven't exercised it, but they don't do contracts for special access. I'm just referring to 18 Mr. Pfau's testimony.

MR. KEFFER: You asked a question about intrastate special access volumes, and I think they're very, very small. The vast bulk of special 22 | access purchases are from the interstate tariff.

1 MR. PFAU: That's my understanding, too.

MS. PREISS: Better rates.

MS. FOX: That's exactly right.

MR. THAGGART: Question directed to the AT&T panel also from AT&T Exhibit 2. testimony, you describe a proposed transitional mechanism to address Verizon's lower total revenues as a result of conversion to UNE combinations. you familiar with that proposal?

MR. PFAU: Can you point me to that?

MR. THAGGART: Let me see if I can find

12 it. Under the pressure of being asked, I cannot

14 Just so the record's clear, you are not 15 familiar with the proposal, the transitional

find it. But I will come back to it.

16 mechanism proposal?

17 MR. PFAU: It's just not ringing a bell.

I may think of it in other terms.

19 MR. THAGGART: I would like to go to issue

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Earlier today, Mr. Goyal was asking the 22||Verizon panel about instances where service would

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1 be disconnected or altered in connection with 2 converting from a special access service to a UNE 3 service, UNE combination.

Do you recall that testimony?

MS. GILLIGAN: Yes.

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MR. THAGGART: Just so that the record is clear, could you, starting with disconnections, give specific examples of where the service would have to be disconnected when converting from 10 special access to UNE combinations.

MS. FOX: Well, I've testified earlier 12 that there wouldn't be any disconnection in that 13 case. Nothing that I can think of, nor any example that anyone has been able to give me.

MS. GILLIGAN: The examples worked for UNE 16 platform.

MR. THAGGART: Moving to instances where 18 services would have to be altered, after the 19 service has been converted to a UNE combination, 20 can you give examples of when the service would 21 have to be altered without WorldCom's or AT&T's 22 permission?

MS. FOX: Specifically with special access 1 to EEL conversion? 3 MR. THAGGART: Yes--no. After the service has been converted to UNE combination. 5 MS. FOX: When it would have to be altered? 6 Is there an example of -- no, I don't think of any. 8 MR. GANSERT: I think--9 MR. THAGGART: Let the first witness 10 answer. 11 You cannot? 12 MS. FOX: As far as I know, once you 13 completed conversion of special access to EEL, what reason would there be to alter that circuit for a 14 reason related to the conversion itself? 15 I can't think of any reason for that. 16 17 MR. THAGGART: Next witness. The only comment that I was 18 MR. GANSERT: 19 going to make is that in the general administration 20 and design management of the network, there were times when facilities need to be replaced or 21 | removed or changed, and so there could be times

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once a conversion had been made that alterations would be made.

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Typically that's with the cooperation of the customer. You wouldn't do it without informing the customer.

MR. THAGGART: Could the proposed contract language anticipate or specify that there are instances where alterations may take place but at the permission of the customer?

MS. FOX: But that's a different issue than the conversion itself, right? So, is it important to say that throughout the life of a circuit that a customer purchases from Verizon that it could never be disconnected, period? Or are we really talking about when we convert special access to EEL, there is no need to do a disconnect. 17 related to that?

MR. THAGGART: Ma'am, I wasn't asking about the hypothetical, however. There is specific testimony that AT&T or WorldCom wants language in the agreement that states that there would be no alteration or separation or disconnection without

their permission, and so my question was whether the Interconnection Agreement language could properly reflect that, or is there a reason that it could not.

I think that language is too MR. GANSERT: 6 restrictive.

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As I said, I think as a general policy, I think we have language already in most of the agreements, as I understand it, where we do talk about the need that there may be needs to do modifications in the network, and we will cooperate in every way to avoid disruption of service, and that's even true with our regular customers. it's just a question of degree that there are times when things have to be altered, and you can't get people's permission to do that, and our service requirements supersede the -- qetting the convenience of the customers.

MR. ANTONIOU: One example of that would be if one went from having copper in the loop and upgraded the loop planted to fiber, there would be a change in that particular circuit in that case.

MR. PFAU: But are you doing that when 2 you're converting the circuit?

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MR. ANTONIOU: No. We are not talking about the conversion process. We are trying to answer the specific question about during the life of the circuit two or three or four years down the line, whatever the period is. We might be very well take a particular area that has copper plant and convert that to fiber to upgrade the network.

MR. PFAU: That may be true, but that's not at issue in the language we proposed.

> MS. FOX: But that's the question asked.

MS. GILLIGAN: The specific examples that 14∥we did cite were related to UNE platform and not special access, and I guess our issue with that language is that it was very restrictive because it implied that we would never do it. And there are some isolated instances where it could happen.

> MR. THAGGART: Thank you. I will move on.

I would like to direct the panel's attention to at that time AT&T Exhibit 2 once aqain. This time I'm looking at page 19 of AT&T

1 Exhibit 2, beginning with line six, and I will read It's AT&T's testimony, and AT&T testifies that 3 dobviously the OSS UNE just as a loop or dedicated transport UNE is part of a single combination that 5 currently operates in an integrated manner to 6∥provide access services today. The lanquage 7 reflected in AT&T's Section 111352 is simply an 8 explicit acknowledgement of the Commission's 9 requirements set forth in Section 51.315 B of the 10 Commission's rules.

Versus may not disconnect OSS UNEs 12 employed to support wholesale access UNEs employed to support EELs if such a connection degrades the operational support delivered for the combination such as EELs.

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And the reference to AT&T's Section 111352 is found in AT&T Exhibit 1 B.

Verizon, I'm going to ask you a question 19 | about AT&T's proposed language in AT&T Exhibit 1 B, specifically 111352. Are you prepared to answer a question about Section 111352?

MR. ANTONIOU: We will do our best.

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MR. THAGGART: What objection, if any, do you have to AT&T's proposed language in that section?

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MS. FOX: In general, the objection is that that language would require us to provide that UNE prices, everything we provide for special access although at UNE rates. So that was the objection to that sentence.

MR. THAGGART: Perhaps I misread this.

MS. FOX: Because to me that says you are going to do--what this says to me is you are going to do maintenance and repair for the converted service equal to what you converted from. So, if you're converting from special access to an EEL, that everything do you for an EEL is equal to what you do for special access. And that's what I object to.

MR. THAGGART: Perhaps I should ask as a point of clarification to AT&T, does Section 111352 at all deal with OSS?

MR. PFAU: Yes, that would be the dealing with the OSS, saying that if you are supporting a

1∥service prior to conversion in a particular manner, 2 it has to be continued to be supported in the same 3 manner afterwards.

MR. THAGGART: In light of that 5 clarification, would you respond.

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MS. FOX: I'm not sure I agree with that conclusion.

MR. THAGGART: Please explain to me why so 8 9 that I understand.

MS. FOX: What maintenance and repair 11 standards should apply to an EEL? Theoretically, 12 | it's the equivalent retail service; what AT&T would 13 | have us do is apply special access maintenance and 14 repair.

In fact, there is probably very little 16∥difference in what we would do for a DS1 or DS3 EEL compared to special access.

However, I don't understand this tenuous 19 conclusion that AT&T has made somehow that related 20 to OSS, that now once it's converted, somehow it 21 has to be the same with special access. I just 22 really don't agree that that's the case.